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Abstract: 
On the basis of the approach–avoid dynamics assumed by reactance theory (S. S. Brehm & J. W. Brehm, 1981) 
and other models (E. S. Knowles & J. A. Linn, 2004), it was predicted that interpersonal similarity can reduce 
reactance by increasing compliance and by reducing resistance. A communicator‘s similarity to the participant 
was manipulated by identical first names and birthdays (Experiment 1) and by congruent values (Experiment 2). 
People then read essays in which the communicator did or did not threaten their attitudinal freedom. Threats 
caused boomerang effects only when the communicator‘s similarity was low or unknown. When the 
communicator was highly similar to the participant, people agreed strongly, regardless of threat. Similarity 
increased the force toward persuasion by increasing liking, and it decreased the force toward resistance by 
making the message seem less threatening. Implications for reactance theory and for resistance to persuasion are 
discussed. 
 
Article: 
Sometimes, social influence backfires (J. W. Brehm,1966; S. S. Brehm &Brehm, 1981). Social influence can 
threaten people‘s freedom to decide autonomously, to form their own opinions, to hold various attitudes (or 
none at all), and to do what they feel free to do. When people think that a freedom is threatened they experience 
reactance, a motivational state aimed at restoring the threatened freedom (J. W. Brehm, 1966). One way to 
bolster a threatened freedom is to exercise the freedom—people thus seek censored activities, show 
―boomerang effects‖ in response to threatening messages, and choose forbidden decision alternatives (J. W. 
Brehm & Cole, 1966; J. W. Brehm & Mann, 1975). 
 
Congruent with reactance theory, a large literature shows that social influence is more successful when it does 
not threaten important freedoms (S. S. Brehm &Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974), yet, according to the theory, 
threats to freedom do not inevitably reduce compliance. The theory suggests conditions in which people will 
comply with threatening messages, although few experiments have examined these conditions. After reviewing 
the theoretical basis for persuasion in the face of threats to freedom, this article describestwo experimentsthat 
show how interpersonal similarity can overcome resistance to persuasion in threatening influence contexts. 
 
DEFLECTING REACTANCE 
How can reactance be prevented in the face of threats to freedom? The answer comes from the approach–avoid 
dynamics of social influence assumed by reactance theory, which proposes that influence attempts create forces 
to comply and forces to react (S. S. Brehm &Brehm, 1981). As Worchel and Brehm (1971) contended, ―Social-
influence threats to freedom ... create a combination of positive and negative forces, and the resultant behavior 
is a function of these opposing forces‖ (p. 303). Viewing reactance and compliance as products of conflicting 
forces implies several ways of overcoming resistance to persuasion (see Knowles & Linn, 2004). First, acting 
on either force independently will affect compliance. A communicator can increase the positive force toward 
compliance, perhaps by increasing his or her credibility or attractiveness. Conversely, the communicator can re-
duce the negative force by undermining resistance (Davis & Knowles, 1999). Second, affecting both forces 
simultaneously—increasing the positive force and decreasing the negative force—should sharply affect 
compliance. Relative to the first two methods, it causes the largest shift in the resultant ratio of positive to 
negative forces. 
 
When a communicator delivers a message that contains a threat to freedom, the message creates a positive force 
to comply as well as a stronger force to react. If the negative force is reduced so that the forces are equal, then 
no attitude change will appear—the person will show neither enhanced agreement nor disagreement. If the 
negative force is substantially reduced, so that the positive force outweighs the negative force, then the person 
will comply. The analysis of positive and negative forces organizes ways of deflecting reactance in the face of 
threats to freedom. Some methods for deflecting reactance increase the positive force; other methods decrease 
the negative force. Committing people to interact with the communicator in the future (Pallak &Heller, 1971), 
for example, increases the force toward compliance. Anticipated interaction, by affecting liking and the need to 
interact harmoniously, should increase the reasons for compliance. Methods based on reducing resistance 
include makingpeople feel incompetent to exercise a freedom (Wicklund & Brehm, 1968); having people 
exercise a freedom prior to the threat (Snyder & Wicklund, 1976), thus reducing the perceived magnitude of the 
threat; increasing the anticipation of regret that would follow reactance (Crawford, McConnell, Lewis, 
&Sherman, 2002); and seeing another person reassert the threatened freedom, thus reducing the threat to one‘s 
own freedom by implication (Worchel & Brehm, 1971). 
 
SIMILARITY AND REACTANCE 
An untested method for reducing resistance involves interpersonal similarity. Unlike other methods, which 
affect the positive or the negative force, high similarity might simultaneously affect both positive and negative 
influence forces. If so, then similarity should be a particularly potent method of overcoming reactance in the 
face of threats to freedom. Similarity increases the positive force toward compliance by increasing liking 
(Byrne, 1971, 1997). Attraction to the communicator is a well-known force toward compliance. Liking another 
person increases the tendency to like objects that the other person likes (Heider, 1958). Similarity also enhances 
the communicator‘s credibility, which further increases the force toward compliance. As Hovland, Janis, and 
Kelley (1953) remarked, 
 
An individual is likely to feel that persons with status, values, interests, and needs similar to his own see things as he does and judge 
them from the same point of view. Because of this, their assertions about matters of which the individual is ignorant but where he feels 
the viewpoint makes a difference ... will tend to carry special credibility. (p. 22) 
 
Similarity should decrease the negative force toward resistance by influencing perceptions of the degree of 
threat. Similarity and liking profoundly affect social perception—people interpret the actions of liked others in 
positive, flattering ways. In an early study of similarity (Kelley &Woodruff, 1956), students at a progressive 
college listened to a recorded speech advocating a return to conventional teaching practices. Throughout the 
speech, the audience would clap, indicating approval of the communicator‘s arguments. When students thought 
that the audience consisted of faculty members from their college, they faced an inconsistency: A group they 
liked supported a position they disliked. These people changed their impressions of the communication to be 
more consistent with their own view and with the view of their group. They viewed the speaker‘s arguments as 
more progressive, relative to a group believing the audience consisted of community members from another 
town. 
 
Furthermore, people make flattering attributions for the actions of liked others. Regan, Straus, and Fazio (1974) 
found that people made internal attributions for a liked person‘s success and external attributions for a liked 
person‘s failure. Research on interpersonal closeness and attribution shows similar findings (Sedikides, 
Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot,1998). People blamed distant others, but not close others, for the dyad‘s failure: 
Closeness increased liking, and liking reduced attributions for failure (cf. Campbell, Sedikides, Reeder, &Elliot, 
2000). Other research shows that liked others are spared the blame for one‘s own failure (Silvia &Duval, 2001). 
After failing a creativity task, people made attributions to the self and to the group members who created the 
task. People who made self-serving attributions pinned the blame on the disliked group members; the liked 
group member, however, was not blamed for the individual‘s failure. 
 
Taken together, research suggests that similarity can have multiple effects relevant to deflecting reactance. First, 
similarity can increase the positive force toward compliance by increasing liking for the communicator. Second, 
similarity can reduce the negative force toward resistance by fostering positive interpretations of the 
communicator‘s actions, particularly the degree of threat in the message. If people seethe similar person‘s 
message as being less threatening, then the force toward resistance is less strong. By amplifying the positive 
force and reducing the negative force, similarity could be particularly effective at creating compliance in the 
face of threats to freedom. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In Experiment 1, people encountered a communicator who varied in similarity. In one condition, people had a 
highly similar communicator who shared their birthday, first name, gender, and year in school. In another 
condition, people had a less similar communicator who did not share any of these features. In a third condition, 
people received the message without getting any information about the communicator. People then received a 
message that did or did not threaten their freedom to hold a different attitude. Agreement with the 
communicator was then measured. When similarity is low or unknown, threats to freedom should reduce 
agreement with the communicator‘s position. When similarity is high, however, reactance should be averted; 
people will agree with the communicator even when the message is threatening. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 62 undergraduates (19 men and 43 women) enrolled in Introduction to Psychology at the University 
of Kansas (KU) volunteered to participate and received credit toward a research participation option. Each 
person was randomly assigned to condition in a 3 (similarity: high, low, unstated) × 2 (threat to attitudinal 
freedom: high, low) between-subject factorial design, using randomized blocks of six. Separate blocking sets 
were used for each gender, ensuring similar proportions of men and women in each cell. 
 
Procedure 
A male experimenter greeted the participant and led him or her to a private room. On entering the room, the 
participant could see two tables: a small table with a chair, and a larger table against the opposite wall. The 
larger table contained three file folders marked with big numbers. The experimenter explained that the study 
was the second part of a two-semester study on personality, reading, and writing. Last semester, several hundred 
participants had presumably completed a battery of personality scales and wrote three essays. During the 
present semester, the researchers wanted to collect information on reading and personality. The participant 
expected to complete a series of personality scales, read the three essays written by a single person from the 
previous semester, and give impressions and opinions about the essays. Participants were assured of anonymity 
(Wright &Brehm, 1982); they expected to seal their questionnaires in an envelope and place it into a box full of 
envelopes. 
 
The participant‘s attention was drawn to the three file folders on the opposing table; these folders ostensibly 
containedthe essays. Three essays were used to divert suspicion from the ―first essay,‖ which was the only essay 
people actually read. Expecting to read several essays was intended to increase potential reactance through 
implied threats—if the first essay threatens attitudinal freedom, people might expect the remaining essays to 
assail other freedoms. To divert suspicion further, the experimenter said that three types of essays—opinion, 
imaginative, and factual—were collected, and the participant would randomly receive one person‘s set of essays 
from the set of several hundred different people. 
 
Participants read apage-long description of the study and then completed a brief ―Background Items‖ 
questionnaire said to be ―included in all of our studies.‖ This survey asked for the participant‘s first and last 
names, gender, date of birth, home state, year in school, major, and favorite hobbies. Afterward, the 
experimenter re-entered the room and gave the participant the ―Personality Questionnaire‖ that allegedly as-
sessed the aspects of personality thought to be relevant to reading and writing; the questionnaire contained filler 
scales. The experimenter took the participant‘s informed consent form, the page describing the study, and the 
Background Items sheet before leaving the room. 
 
Similarity manipulation. While the participant completed the personality questionnaire, the experimenter (who 
had been unaware of condition assignments before this point) went to a nearby control room, consulted a 
random assignment chart, and prepared the similarity manipulation. The experimenter made a Background 
Items sheet describing the person whose essays the participant would ostensibly read. In the high similarity 
condition, the communicator shared the participant‘s first name, birthday, gender, and year in school (the last 
two being necessitated by the first two) and had Kansas as the home state, was in the 1st year at KU, put ―still 
unsure‖ when asked for a major, and listed ―hanging out with friends, watching movies, cycling, guitar‖ as 
hobbies. Perceiving similarity on names and birthdays has the same general effects as perceiving similarity on 
more important dimensions (Brown, Novick, Lord, &Richards, 1992; Miller, Downs, &Prentice, 1998). In the 
low similarity condition, the communicator did not share the participant‘s first name, birthday, or gender. 
Instead, participants encountered ―Dean Tesser‖ or ―Diana Tesser,‖ who was born January 7, 1982; all other 
information (home state, hobbies) was the same as in the high-similarity condition. In the unstated similarity 
condition, no information was given about the communicator. This final condition was included to see if merely 
having information about the communicator mattered. 
 
Threat to attitudinal freedom manipulation. The sheet containing the similarity manipulation was stapled on top 
of a second sheet, which contained the communicator‘s ―first opinion essay.‖ To maximize reactance, I used a 
topic that nearly all university students would endorse. Threatening attitudinal freedom creates more reactance 
when people agree with the communicator‘s position (Worchel &Brehm, 1970; Wright, 1986). When people 
disagree, the mere fact of disagreement establishes their freedom to hold a contrary attitude and thus reduces 
reactance (S. S. Brehm &Brehm, 1981). 
 
In the high threat conditions, participants received the following essay: 
 
Well, for my first opinion essay I want to write about the attitude that KU has about the students. I know I will persuade you about 
this. In their rush to satisfy the faculty, staff, alumni, and the sports and business communities, KU has forgotten an important group, 
the students. Sometimes it seems like students are second-class citizens here. Who gets the worst parking spots? When the faculty and 
staff demand higher salaries, who foots the bill? When sports fans flood the campus for sporting events, who can‘t get a parking space 
(or sometimes even drive onto campus) to use the libraries or computer facilities? And the close ties between KU and big businesses, 
like Coke and credit card companies, are also a little strange. The university certainly gets money by allowing corporations to sell and 
market to students; what do the students gain? I think that KU needs to remember its primary purpose: promoting excellent education. 
I know you agree with my opinion. In fact, you’re really forced to agree because KU students can’t have differing opinions on this 
issue. 
 
The italicized sentences are the threatening elements; they were not italicized in the study. In the low-threat 
condition, participants received the same essay without the italicized sentences. Adding coercive statements to a 
communication is one of the most widely used threat manipulations in reactance research (see S. S. Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981). 
 
Recall that the participants thought the first essay was already sitting in a folder on the other table in the 
experimental room. Making the person believe that the communicator‘s demographic information and essay had 
been sitting in the room the whole time was intended to avert suspicion about the similarity manipulation. The 
experimenter needed a covert way of switching the dummy folder in the room for the new folder containing the 
similarity and threat manipulations. The experimenter placed the new folder, which was identical to the dummy 
folder, behind his clipboard. When the participant opened the door, the experimenter entered and asked him or 
her to place the questionnaire in an envelope to ensure anonymity. While the participant spent a few seconds 
folding the questionnaire, the experimenter switched the folders. The switch was done covertly via a ―slate 
switch‖ (Annemann, 1983). From the participant‘s perspective, the experimenter entered, gave an envelope, 
retrieved the folder marked 1, and placed it onto the participant‘s desk. 
 
The experimenter opened the folder and removed the questionnaire. In the high- and low-similarity conditions, 
the first sheet contained the Background Items sheet for the fictional communicator; there was no top sheet in 
the unknown-similarity condition. The experimenter justified the information by noting that ―people find it 
helps to have a bit of information about the person‘s background when judging their writing‖; he also asked the 
participant to mark whether the participant knew the person, as a way of forcing attention to the person‘s 
information and further justifying the information‘s presence. The experimenter asked participants to go over 
the background information, read the essay on the next page, and then answer the questions following the essay. 
The main dependent measure was ―How much do you agree with the author?‖ on a scale ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (very much). Participants then put their questionnaires into envelopes to ensure anonymous responses. 
After probing for suspicion or prior knowledge of the experiment, the experimenter debriefed the participants. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Did high similarity enable persuasion in the face of threats to freedom? Initial analyses found no differences 
between the low- and unstated-similarity conditions, so subsequent analyses collapsed them into a single low-
similarity group. A 2 × 2 factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of 
similarity, F(1, 58) = 21.02,p < .001; no effect of threat (F < 1); and a marginal interaction, F(1, 58) = 2.64,p < 
.11. The overall ANOVA was followed up with planned contrasts that tested the central predictions. 
 
The data in Table 1 show the effects of similarity and threat on agreement with the communicator. When 
similarity was low, people in the low-threat condition agreed more than people in the high-threat condition, 
t(58) = 2.04,p < .046. This replicates the standard reactance effect. When similarity was high, however, people 
in the low- and high-threat conditions agreed equally (t < 1). Similarity had a strong effect on agreement. When 
threat was low, people agreed more with the similar communicator than with the dissimilar communicator, t(58) 
= 2.03,p < .05. When threat was high, people still agreed more with the similar communicator than with the 
dissimilar communicator, t(58) = 4.48,p < .001. This shows persuasion in the face of threats to freedom. 
Experiment 1 demonstrates both reactance and compliance. Threatening messages reduced agreement relative 
to normal messages, but only when similarity was low. When similarity was high, threats to freedom did not 
create reactance. In fact, the threatening-and-similar communicator did not merely ―do no harm‖ or avert 
disagreement—this communicator was effective. People agreed with the threatening-similar communicator as 
much as they agreed with the unthreatening-similar communicator; people agreed with both communicators 
close to the ceiling of the scale. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 supported the basic predictions about similarity and reactance. Experiment 2 extended the first 
study by examining the underlying dynamics in more detail. It is presumed that similarity increases reasons for 
compliance and decreases reasons for resistance. In particular, (a) similarity should increase liking, which is a 
force toward compliance, and (b) similarity should promote seeing the threatening message as less threatening, 
which reduces the force toward reactance. To test these predictions, Experiment 2 included measures of liking 
and perceived threat to freedom. Experiment 2 thus enabled a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 as well as 
analyses of whether similar communicators were liked more and seen as less threatening. 
 
The interaction effect in Experiment 1 was marginally significant, perhaps because of the subtle manipulation of 
similarity. Experiment 2 thus used a stronger similarity manipulation. Participants ranked 10 values on the basis 
of personal importance and then encountered a communicator with a nearly identical or a nearly opposite value 
ranking. Personal values, as an important dimension of similarity, should enable a strong manipulation of 
similarity and a large effect of similarity on attraction (Byrne, London, & Griffitt, 1968; Byrne &Nelson, 1964, 
1965). Furthermore, replicating Experiment 1 with a different manipulation demonstrates the generality of 
similarity‘s effects on reactance. 
 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 50 undergraduates (27 women and 23 men) from KU and the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro (UNCG) volunteered to participate and received credit toward a research participation option. Each 
person was randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (similarity: high, low) × 2 (threat to attitudinal freedom: high, 
low) between-subject factorial design, using randomized blocks of four. Separate blocking sets were used for 
each gender, ensuring nearly equal proportions of men and women in each cell. Two participants were 
excluded—one was highly suspicious, and the other did not follow the procedure—leaving a total of 48 par-
ticipants. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, with a few exceptions. Participants ranked 10 values (equality, 
happiness, justice, peace, true friendship, power, exciting life, accomplishment, freedom, and creativity) in 
terms of personal importance. The experimenter made a bogus values survey for the fictional communicator 
while participants completed filler scales. In the high similarity conditions, the communicator had a nearly 
identical value ranking; the first and last ranks were always identical, and the participant‘s top and bottom three 
values always appeared in the communicator‘s top and bottom three. In the low similarity conditions, the 
communicator had a nearly opposite value ranking. 
 
After reading the communicator‘s values, people completed a ―First Impressions Scale,‖ actually Byrne‘s 
(1971) attraction measure. This measure of liking has two items, embedded within some filler items: ―If you 
met, how much do you think you would like this person?‖ and ―Overall, how positive or negative does this 
person seem?‖ Participants then read the persuasive communication. The same opinion essay was used, but it 
was reworded slightly. First, all of the threatening elements appeared at the end of the essay. This was done in 
the unlikely event that threats at the start of a message introduce unknown confounds associated with message 
processing. Second, for participants from UNCG (approximately 25% of the sample) the essay read UNCG 
instead of KU. 
 
After reading the essay, participants completed a short questionnaire. Agreement with the communicator was 
measured with one item: ―How much do you agree with the author?‖ Three items measured the perceived 
coerciveness of the communication: (a) ―The essay writer was trying too hard to persuade me,‖ (b) ―The essay 
writer was trying to keep me from making up my own mind about the topic,‖ and (c) ―The essay writer was 
‗pushy.‘‖ The final item was a manipulation check for the similarity manipulation: ―Overall, how similar are 
you to the author?‖ All questions used 7-point Likert- type scales ranging from not at all to very much. 
 
Results 
Initial analyses found no significant effects involving gender or the location of data collection, so these 
variables are not discussed further. The descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 2. 
 
Manipulation Check for Similarity. A factorial ANOVA on the similarity manipulation check revealed a sole 
main effect of similarity, F(1, 44) = 66.4,p < .001. High value similarity led to high perceived similarity, 
regardless of whether the communicator threatened the person‘s attitudinal freedom. 
 
Agreement and Reactance. A factorial ANOVA tested whether similarity and threat affected agreement with the 
communicator. This analysis revealed a main effect of similarity, F(1, 44) = 30.32,p < .001, which was 
qualified by the predicted interaction, F(1, 44) =5.57,p <.023. The interaction was followed by planned 
ANOVA contrasts for the comparisons of interest. Table 2 shows the pattern of agreement. The pattern from 
Experiment 1 was replicated exactly. When similarity was low, threatening freedom caused reactance—the 
high-threat group agreed less relative to the low-threat group, t(44) = 2.38,p < .022. When similarity was high, 
however, 
 
 
threats had no effect—the high- and low-threat groups did not differ (t < 1). Furthermore, people in the high-
similarity conditions agreed strongly with the communicator‘s message. High similarity increased agreement in 
both the low-threat, t(44) = 2.23,p < .031, and high-threat, t(44) = 5.56,p < .001, conditions. As before, the 
experiment shows both failed and successful social influence. 
 
Effects of Similarity on Liking. Similarity should increase liking for the communicator (Byrne, 1971).A factorial 
ANOVA on the two-item measure of attraction (a = .91) found only a main effect of similarity, F(1, 44) = 
69.2,p < .001. (No interaction would be expected, because liking was measured before threat was manipulated.) 
As expected, people in the high-similarity group expressed more liking for the communicator than did people in 
the low-similarity group. This replicates the results of many past experiments (Byrne, 1971) and shows how 
similarity creates liking, a positive force toward compliance. 
 
Effects of Similarity and Threat on Perceptions of Threat. Similarity should reduce the negative force toward 
resistance by promoting positive interpretations of the threat: If the threat seems smaller, then reactance should 
decrease. The three items measuring perceived threat were averaged into a single index (a = .89). A factorial 
ANOVA revealed two significant main effects and no interaction (F = 2.5,p < .12). The main effect of threat 
showed, not surprisingly, that the low-threat groups perceived the communication as less coercive than did the 
high-threat groups, F(1, 44) = 33.7,p < .001. The main effect of similarity found that the high-similarity groups 
perceived the communication as less coercive, F(1, 44) = 5.15,p < .028. 
 
The main effect of similarity shows that similarity reduced perceptions of threat. The important test, however, is 
whether similarity reduced perceptions of threat even when the communicator was highly threatening. This 
prediction was tested with a planned contrast. As anticipated, within the high-threat conditions, the high-
similarity group perceived the communicator as less coercive than did the low-similarity group, t(44) = 2.72,p < 
.009. This shows how similarity can reduce the negative force toward resistance by reducing perceived threat. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated and extended the findings of Experiment 1. First, the same pattern of agreement 
appeared, exactly replicating Experiment 1. When similarity was low, threatening attitudinal freedom led to less 
agreement. When similarity was high, however, threatening freedom had no effect: People strongly agreed with 
the communicator regardless of the level of threat. By replicating the first study with a different manipulation of 
similarity, Experiment 2 lends additional support for a moderating role of similarity in reactance. Beyond 
replication, Experiment 2 showed that similarity increased liking (the positive force) and reduced perceptions of 
threat (the negative force). 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Although many experiments find that persuaders are more effective when they avoid threatening persuasion 
tactics (S. S. Brehm &Brehm, 1981), threats will not always cause resistance to persuasion. The theoretical 
issue for reactance theory is to explain when people do and do not show reactance in the face of threats to 
freedom. These experiments examined interpersonal similarity as a moderator of reactance. Similarity can shift 
the balance of forces toward compliance and resistance by affecting both forces simultaneously. First, feeling 
similar to another person increases attraction to the person (Byrne, 1971). Liking is a well-known force toward 
compliance (Heider, 1958). Second, similarity and attraction promote resistance-reducing perceptions. People 
interpret the actions of liked others in ways that maintain a positive image of the other person, such as 
minimizing differences of opinion (Kelley &Woodruff, 1956) and making other-enhancing attributions for the 
liked person‘s actions (Regan et al.,1974; Sedikides et al., 1998; Silvia &Duval, 2001). People may thus 
interpret coercive actions as being less coercive when they are made by similar others. 
 
Two experiments tested the prediction that similar people can persuade in the face of threats. In Experiment 1, 
people encountered a communicator who shared their first name and birthday, a communicator with a dissimilar 
name and birthday, or an anonymous communicator. In Experiment 2, people encountered a communicator with 
a nearly identical ranking of basic values or a communicator with a nearly opposite ranking of values. The 
communicator then delivered a normal message or a threatening message. Threatening messages from the 
dissimilar and anonymous communicators created reactance, relative to the normal messages, yet a threatening 
message from the similar communicator was just as persuasive as a normal message; the threatening influence 
attempt succeeded. 
 
Experiment 2 examined why similarity enabled persuasion in the face of threats to freedom. As predicted, 
similarity increased liking, thus demonstrating how similarity increases a positive force toward compliance. 
Furthermore, similarity affected how people perceived the threat to freedom. People saw messages from similar 
communicators as less threatening than messages from dissimilar communicators. By reducing perceptions of 
the threat, similarity reduced a force toward resistance. The findings thus demonstrate how similarity can 
enhance compliance and reduce resistance. The end result is heightened agreement, even in the face of strong 
threats to attitudinal freedom. 
 
The result of positive and negative forces can lead to agreement, disagreement, or no change. The classic 
reactance finding, of course, is disagreement in response to threats. In attempting to deflect reactance, many 
experiments found no change; the forces toward compliance and reactance were apparently equally strong, thus 
leading to no social influence. For example, prior exercise of the threatened freedom (Snyder & 
Wicklund,1976), anticipated future interaction with the threatening communicator (Pallak & Heller, 1971), and 
feeling incompetent to exercise the freedom (Wicklund &Brehm, 1968) reduced reactance, but they did not 
create positive social influence. 
 
Positive social influence in the face of threats is an uncommon finding in reactance research. In one experiment 
(Crawford et al., 2002), reducing the negative force—emphasizing regret associated with resistance—led to 
substantial agreement with a persuasive attempt (although the level of threat was not manipulated). Another 
experiment reduced the negative force toward resistance by having another person assert the freedom, thereby 
restoring the participant‘s freedom by implication (Worchel &Brehm, 1971, Experiment 2). People were 
significantly persuaded by the threatening communicator when the threat was removed by implication. People 
agreed significantly with the threatening communicator, apparently because similarity shifted both the positive 
and negative forces engendered by the communication. This supports the assumptions about social influence 
made by reactance theory and demonstrates that resistance to persuasion can be overcome despite threats to 
freedom. 
 
Future research should examine the dynamics of similarity and reactance in more detail. One limitation of the 
present research is the lack of information regarding mediational pathways that connect similarity to persuasion. 
The experiments were designed to emphasize manipulated effects— that is, the effect of the similarity 
manipulation on liking, the interactive effect of similarity and threat on perceptions of threat—not internal 
mediation analyses. Thus, the order of measures of liking (after the similarity manipulation but before the threat 
manipulation) and perceived threat (after the measures of liking and agreement) in Experiment 2 precludes the 
comparison of different mediational models. At the same time, the large literature on social influence shows that 
it is reasonable to presume that liking and perceived threat affected agreement. 
 
One promising direction for future work concerns mediating variables that were not examined in this research. 
Liking and perception of threat are certainly not the only proximal causes of compliance and resistance (e.g., 
Jacks &Cameron, 2003). It seems likely that similarity could moderate resistance to persuasion by affecting 
other variables, such as perceptions of the communicator‘s credibility, the importance of the issue, perceptions 
of argument quality, and degree of message elaboration. Exploring these directions will clarify the inner 
psychological workings of the approach–avoid metaphor of compliance and resistance that is popular in models 
of resistance to persuasion (S. S. Brehm &Brehm, 1981; Knowles & Linn, 2004). 
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